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THE AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF: FROM FRIENDSHIP TO
ADVOCACY
SAMUEL KRISLOVt
THE pretense by the lawyer that all precedents are, in Holmes' phrase, "born
free and equal" all too often produces a curious portrait of a static legal uni-
verse where instruments and decisions alike avoid both decay and develop-
ment. Yet, scholars 1 have demonstrated many times over that imaginative util-
ization of the historical approach can produce insights which have been con-
cealed by a fallacious assumption of homogeneity.
One device that, when not altogether ignored, has been thought of primarily
in this antihistorical vein is the amicus curiae brief. Its delusive innocuousness,
its seemingly static function and terminology, taken together with the offhand
manner of its usual use in court, have in combination forestalled intensive schol-
arly study. Inasmuch as the device was apparently known in Roman law - and
was an early instrument of the common law, the assumption has been that it
has remained functionally unchanged as long as the term has remained constant.
Yet, the Supreme Court's first promulgation of a written rule on the subject
of such briefs in 1937 followed by two modifications of this newly codified pro-
vision within a span of twenty years belies the assumption of permanence."
Quietly but unmistakably, such change demonstrates the transition that has
occurred and continues to occur in the use of the brief.
THE Amicus CURIAE AT COMMON LAW
The early use of the device is still preserved in the standard definitions, and
may be found today in such sources as Corpus Juris Secundum. As Abbott's
Dictionary of Terms and Phrases describes it, the amicus curiae is:
A friend of the court. A term applied to a bystander, who without having
an interest in the cause, of his own knowledge makes suggestion on a point
of law or of fact for the information of the presiding judge.
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tLiots, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 484 (Sayre ed. 1947).
2. See I BouviEs LAw DI TIoNARY 188 (Rawle's 3d ed. 1914) (under definition of
"amicus curiae").
3. See Harper & Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. lnv. 1172
(1953), probably the path-finding article on this topic, and Wiener, The Supreme Court's
New Rules, 68 HARv. L. REV. 20 (1954).
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Holthouse's Law Dictionary, of older vintage, puts it in even more stately
fashion:
When a judge is doubtful or mistaken in matter of law, a bystander may
inform the court thereof as amicus curiae. Counsel in court frequently act
in this capacity when they happen to be in possession of a case which the
judge has not seen or does not at the moment remember.
The function of the amicus curiae at common law was one of oral "Shepard-
izing," the bringing up of cases not known to the judge. The Yearbook cite
many instances of such aid by bystanders, who not only acted on behalf of in-
fants, but also called attention to manifest error, to the death of a party to the
proceeding, and to existing appropriate statutes.4 Occasionally, however, other
information was adduced. In one extreme instance, Sir George Treby, a mem-
ber of Parliament, informed the court that he had been present at the passage
of the statute whose meaning was contested and, as amicus curiae, wished to
inform the court of the intent of Parliament in passing the legislation. The
amicus did not even have to be an attorney to intervene, and the general at-
titude of the courts was to welcome such aid, since "it is for the honor of a
court of justice to avoid error."6
Inasmuch as permission to participate as a friend of the court has always
been a matter of grace rather than right, the courts have from the beginning
avoided precise definition of the perimeters and attendant circumstances in-
volving possible utilization of the device. This, of course, increases judicial dis-
cretion, while it concomitantly maximizes the flexibility of the device. As one
court opinion has quite pointedly stated:
If such appearance was as amicus curiae and as a matter of grace, then
that grace alone concerns us. Grace doth not abound through consent of
one's adversary. It droppeth, withal, like mercy-as the gentle and refresh-
ing dews of Heaven.7
A nineteenth century decision illustrates in cxtrcmis the flexibility of such
participation. In Ex parte Lloyd,8 the reporter of the case, a practicing attor-
ney, had further demonstrated his versatility by accepting retainers from both
4. The Protector v. Geering, 145 Eng. Rep. 394 (1656) (manifest error) ; Falmouth
v. Strode, 11 Mod. 137,88 Eng. Rep. 949 (Q.B. 1707) (information as to death of a party) ;
Beard v. Travers, 1 Vesey Sen. 313, 27 Eng. Rep. 1052 (Ch. 1749) (participation on behalf
of infants) ; and The Prince's Case, 8 Coke 1, 29a, 77 Eng. Rep. 481, 516 (1606) (calling
attention to a statute). The latter case is distinguished for its denouement, with the Court
assailing John and Warwick Hele, the amid curiae:
But in truth the serjeant and his son have not performed the office of a good friend
or of a good informer, for they have omitted one clause in the same Act ... and have
thereby endeavored to deceive the Court. ...
8 Coke at 29a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 516.
5. Horton & Ruesby, Comb. 33, 90 Eng. Rep. 326 (K-B. 1686).
6. The Protector v. Geering, 145 Eng. Rep. 394 (Ex. 1656). However, the often-re-
peated statement that a statute of Henry IV recognizes such a right is held by most competent
authorities to be an error. See Note, Anci Curiae, 34 HtAv. L. Rzv. 773 n.5 (1921).
7. Ex parte Brockma, 233 Mo. 135, 154, 134 S.V. 977, 982 (1911).
8. Reported in Ex parte Elysee, Monte 69,70 na (Ch. 1830).
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sides, and thus felt himself in a quandary. The Lord Chancellor, sitting iit
a bankruptcy case, felt he had no authority to advise an attorney as to which
client to represent; but the Lord Chancellor was not to be outdone in this game
of shifting roles. He promptly appointed himself amicus curiae and in this second
capacity did advise the attorney.0 In short, through lack of precise rules the
English courts developed a highly adaptable instrument for dealing with many
of the problems that arise in adversary proceedings.
Perhaps the most significant enlargement of the amicus curiae function was
itself a partial solution to one of the most serious and enduring shortcomings
of the adversary system. The problem of representation of third parties in a com-
mon law suit (and, for that matter, in equity proceedings in class suits where
large numbers are involved) is one that does not permit either a quick or easy
solution. On the contrary, the difficulties have persisted through the centuries,
and devices designed to mitigate rather than cure have been the rule.
Common law procedures were peculiarly resistant to the expansion of the
scope of participation by third parties in trials. The theory of trial by duel 10
precludes a generous view of the right to intervene. "The fundamental prin-
ciple underlying legal procedure," a court has observed, "is that parties to a
controversy shall have the right to litigate the same, free from the interference
of strangers."" The proposition that the common law knew no intervenors as
parties-a proposition regularly advanced by the courts-may be too sweep-
ing; but if there were exceptions, they were in fringe areas, paralleling equity
cases, as in proceeding involving heirs.'2
The amicus curiae, however, was apparently utilized at an early date to avert
one type of injustice which might otherwise have resulted from strict applica-
tion of the principles of adversary proceedings-namely, to call attention to
collusive suits. The friend of the court could point out either that the proceed-
ing was fraudulent or that it threatened to foreclose the rights of third parties
through collusion. For example, in Coxe v. Phillips,'3 a 1736 case, the action was
on a promissory note. But the suit was collusive, allowing Mrs. Phillips to em-
barrass one Muilman, whose marriage to her had been declared null upon dis-
covery that she had a living husband. Muilman had then proceeded to marry
another woman, to the apparent irritation of Mrs. Phillips. She pleaded her
marriage to Muilman, and her resulting incapacity to contract as a defense. I-ad
9. Ibid. The Reporter so records his own perplexity and its resolution.
10. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80-102 (1950).
11. Consolidated Liquor Corp. v. Scotello & Nizzi, 21 N.M. 485, 494-95, 155 Pac. 1089,
1093 (1916).
12. Berger, Interventioxs by Public Agencies in Private Litigalion in the Federal Courts,
50 YAme L.J. 65 (1940). But see Rogers, Intervention at Cominon Law, 57 L.Q. Pv. 400
(1941). See comments indicating reluctance to permit government participation as late as
1906, in Brooks v. Southern Pac. Co., 148 Fed. 986, 987 (W.D. Ky. 1906),
13. 95 Eng. Rep. 152 (K.B. 1736).
Earlier a court held that "if an indictment be apparently vitious [be the crime what it
will] it ought to be quash'd ... and therefore as amicus Curiae anyone may move to quash
it." Rex v. Vaux, 90 Eng. Rep. 314 (1686).
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this defense been sustained, Muilman's marital status would have been im-
pugned. Although he was not a party to the suit, Mluilman was permitted to
have his interests represented by an amicus curiae. The amicus proved successful,
not only in having the action vacated, but also in having both Coxe and Phillips
found in contempt of court. It is important to note that in spite of the pretense
that the duty of the amicus was solely to protect and inform the court, the
amicus in Coxe was permitted to stray from this exclusive obligation and defend
the interests of one not a party to the law suit. One may cite precedent without
participating basically for one interest or the other; one is unlikely to call "fraud"
to the attention of the court without basically taking sides. The incorporation
of this new function presaged a fundamental transformation in the role of the
amicus curiae--one through which the device would assume radically new
dimensions. While the courts continued to cling to the proposition that the
amicus was a detached servant of the court---"he acts for no one, but simply
seeks to give information to the court" 4 --his services no longer precluded com-
mitmeni to a cause. Indeed, the very notion of his acting for no one vas belied
by his rising to do just the opposite-in many instances to act directly and
officially as counsel for one not formally a party to the case.
Thus, even in its native habitat, the amicus curiae brief early underwent
changes that ultimately were to have profound repercussions. A step had been
taken toward change from neutral friendship to positive advocacy and partisan-
ship.
THE AmIcus CURIAE IN THE UNITED STATES-THE SHIFT FROm
NEUTRALITY TO ADvocAcY
The problems of representation of third party interests under the common
law system were, if anything, exacerbated by the American system. The crea-
tion of a complex federal system meant not only that state and national interests
were potentially in conflict, but also that an even greater number of conflicting
public interests were potentially unrepresented in the course of private suits.
Legal doctrines espoused by the Supreme Court also multiplied these problems.
The assertion of judicial review and of the Court's role as "umpire to the federal
system" meant that disputes taking the form of litigation between private citizens
were in many instances to shape the constitutional contours of the federal system.
While the number of potentially unrepresented interests was greater under
a federal system, the possibility of their being heard in federal court was less.
The first indication that the Supreme Court would strictly scrutinize the right
of parties to appear before federal courts as parties in interest appeared in
1806, in Strawbridge v. Curtiss.Ys In finding no right to sue in federal courts
against joined defendants, only one of whom possessed the requisite diversity
of citizenship, Chief Justice Marshall insisted that "each distinct interest should
be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue or may be sued in
14. Campbell v. Swasey, 12 Ind. 70, 72 (1859).
15. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 267 (1806).
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the federal courts."'16 Although this ruling has not escaped criticism,17 it re-
mains potent not only as originally applied but also as applied to those who seek
to enter the litigation as intervenors.
If this rule excluded some parties from direct participation in federal court
litigation, continuation of the common law history of hostility to intervenors
worked at least an equal limitation on the availability of the federal courts to
interests which were not so self-evident and formally litigious but which might,
in significance and pragmatic political consequences, dwarf the narrowly de-
fined legal issues presented by the litigants. Thus, major constitutional de-
cisions on federal matters have seen the United States government participate,
at least nominally, only as a subsidiary or remote party to the dispute. For in-
stance, an expeditious route to a decision on the validity of a tax provision has
been for a stockholder or other interested party to seek to prevent payment of
the contested tax by a corporation or partnership.18 Such ventures are, at least
in some sense, evasions of the spirit of the "real interest" rule; but they have
the further fillip of relegating the taxing authority to the status of a stranger
to a proceeding testing the validity of its own revenue measures.
These problems did not go unnoticed,1 nor were they left uncompensated.
The Court, while contracting jurisdiction in one direction,20 established loose
categories by which third party governmental authority might be vindicated.
The scope of participation in cases was expanded as early as the decision in
The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden.2 ' In that case the United States At-
torney General was allowed to intervene by way of "a suggestion" in an ad-
miralty suit. Such participation in admiralty actions and in proceedings in rent
became quite common.
It originally was felt that such exceptions were compelled by the peculiar
nature of in rent proceedings which, because they established rights of owner-
ship against the world, required full participation by all who might be adverse-
ly affected.22 As time went on it began to be realized that such equitable con-
siderations were not unique to in rent proceedings. Rather, it was recognized
as inhering in the general nature of the judicial process that innocent by-
standers might be jeopardized. Slowly, as cases multiplied in which difficulties
were experienced in other areas as well, a recognition of the utility of third
party participation became prevalent.2
16. Ibid.
17. See the account in Campbell, Jurisdiction and Venue Aspects of Interventiou under
Federal Rule 24, 7 U. Prrr. L. RFv. 1, 3-4 (1940).
18. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), and the comments there-
on in JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 21, 153 (1941).
19. See FRANB, COURTS ON TRAL 80-102 (1950) ; ARNOLD, SYMBOLs OF GOVERNMENT
(1935).
20. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, supra note 15.
21. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116 (1812).
22. See, e.g., Stratton v. Jarvis, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 4, 9 (1834) ; Campbell, Jurisdiction
and Venue Aspects of Intervention under Federal Rule 24, 7 U. PIT'. L. REv. 1, 5-9 (1940).
23. See Wham, Intervention in Federal Equity Cases, 17 A.B.A.J. 160 (1931) : "It has
grown up almost without legitimate parentage or sponsorship... ." See, e.g., Eliot, Itsler-
ventions in the Federal Courts, 31 Am. L. REv. 377 (1897).
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Amicus Cu riae and Third Party Representation of Governmental Interests
Oddly, the amicus curiae was neither one of the early devices used to resolve
the third party problem in the Supreme Court nor the most frequently utilized.24
Although, given its historical origins and functions, it was unlikely to come
within the pale of common law hostility to intervenors or the rule in Straw-
bridge, and hence might have offered an easy means for representation of out-
side interests, it did not, in fact, make its appearance in the Supreme Court
(or federal courts generally) until after 1820. Courts, where obvious injustice
would be caused by lack of representation, allowed outsiders to intervene gen-
erally by exercise of what was called "the inherent power of a court of law to
control its processes." 25 No great ceremony was attendant on this; often the
court merely extended the privilege of filing a brief "by leave of the court."
Gradually this practice came to be controlled by a set of increasingly formal
rules that were communicated more or less informally to the regular practi-
tioners before the court, or those who habitually handled similar cases on other
levels. 26 It was only at a much later date that these tended to be codified.
To meet the problems caused by narrow processes in an era in which semi-
political decisions were increasingly reached, a number of devices were at hand
in the law or were created. "The ways of the third party" developed by the
courts in this field range widely in degrees of formality. A list suggested a
quarter of a century ago included among others: (a) leave to intervene as
a party or a quasi-party (growing out of early equity proceedings, the right
to intervene has become more general, particularly in the twentieth century
and is based in part upon legislation) ; (b) participation as an ancillary party;
(c) petition or motion or presentation of claim on a fund; (d) amicus curiae;
(e) suggestion or memo; (f) special appearance; (g) class suits.27 One might
possibly add to this list taxpayer suits as some sort of elevation of third parties
to participant status.
Further, in less rigorously legalistic days, when the Attorney General vas
permitted by law and indeed forced by circumstance to maintain a private prac-
tice, it was often possible for him to serve two masters in a case. Sometimes
he could advance the cause of the United States by merely acting in the name
of a party; this seems to have been the case, for example, in Gibbons v. Og-
den 2s In other instances he might represent both the interest of the United
States and obtain a fee for private activity as well. The early usages of the
third party devices tended to be of these more informal sorts.
24. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
25. Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 283 (1884).
26. Eliot, supra note 23, at 392. Of course, today codification is virtually required. See
James Beck's lament on the absence of a distinctive Supreme Court bar in 1930, estimat-
ing the size at that time as at least 30,000. Bncn, MAYi IT PLEASE THE CourT 20 (1930).
27. Hersman, Interiention in Federal Courts, 61 Ams. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1927).
28. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). See Klonosi, The Influence of Government Counsel
on Supreme Court Decisions Involving the Commerce Power 1, 10, 10 n.3, 12 (Ann Arbor:
University Microfilms) (1958).
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So, in Hayburn's Case 29 in 1792, Randolph was allowed to move "ex
officio" for the government, but the Court "entertained great doubt upon his
right.., to proceed" in this manner. The proper mode which emerged through
the years by which third parties were permitted to participate was by route of
the suggestion, as in the case of The Schooner Exchange,"° or general courtesy.
More formally, in 1821, Pinckney was heard upon the application of the ex-
ecutive in the case of The Amiable Isabella.81 As the headnote suggests, ac-
commodation of broader interests was commencing in formal fashion, for the
reporter states the meaning of the case to be that "where a case involved the
construction of a treaty, the court heard a third argument oil the application
of the executive government of the United States. '3 2 In any event, all of these
modes of representation merge into one another, and in various epochs have
often been functional equivalents.
Even in recent years, the precise standing of a party may often be somewhat
vague and differently interpreted by the parties and commentators; the line
between an intervenor and an amicus curiae is often blurred. In former years
the lines were even vaguer, and contradictions and anomalies were quite com-
mon.
Though other devices for representing third party interests were developed
extremely early, it was not until 1821 that the amicus curiae formally made
its appearance. In the celebrated case of Green v. Biddle,83 a decision relating to
land holdings in Kentucky was made by the Supreme Court without any repre-
sentation on the part of that State. Repercussions were quickly evident. Com-
ing on the heels of a series of decisions in which federal courts had asserted
federal supremacy,3 4 the case presented explosive possibilities. It was apparent-
ly thought best to provide some forum for opposition. Under instructions from
the State of Kentucky, Henry Clay made an appearance as an amicus curiae and
sought a rehearing. On March 12,1821, Clay
as amicus curiae moved for a rehearing in the cause, upon the ground that
it involved the rights and claims of numerous occupants of the land....
He stated, that the rights and interests of those claimants would be irre-
vocably determined by this decision of the court, the tenant in the present
cause having permitted it to be brought to a hearing, without appearing
by counsel, and without any argument on that side of the question.3D
Faced with this peculiar behavior on the part of one of the nominal partici-
pants, strongly suggesting collusion, the Court allowed the extraordinary pro-
cedure and granted the plea for a rehearing on petition of an amicus curiae.00 In-
29. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 408 (1792).
30. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116 (1812).
31. The.Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 50 (1821).
32. Id. at 50. Similarly, in United States v. The Late Corporation of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, 150 U.S. 145 (1893), "Mr. Solicitor General watched the
case on behalf of the United States."
33. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
34. See WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 632-51 (1926).
35. 21 U.S. at 17.
36. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 17 (1823).
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asmuch as the anicus curiae is not deemed to be a party, most jurisdictions
would not allow him to initiate such an important procedural motion.
Clay, again acting as an amicus curiae, was later permitted to argue the case.
Again in view of the usual attitude that "an amicus curiae cannot perform any
act on behalf of a party," "he acts for no one," and that "the court on the sug-
gestion of an amicus curiae can do that only which he could do without such
suggestion," this debut of the amicus curiae in the Supreme Court must be
recognized as a dramatic and unusual one.37
The next major step 38 in the development of amicus curiae occurred when
the judges were forced, as a result of Florida v. Gcorgia,39 to articulate some of
the factors involved in such participation. In that case, the request of the At-
torney General of the United States to be heard was opposed by counsel for
the two states, and the Court was forced to grant or deny permission on its
own initiative. Defining the problem, Chief Justice Taney noted that if the
United States were merely requesting to be heard, there would presumably be
no problem, "for it is the familiar practice of the Court to hear the Attorney
General in suits between individuals, when he suggests that the public interests
are involved... not as counsel for one of the parties... but on behalf of the
United States. '40
Why then the difficulty in this case? The nub of the problem vas that the
United States had a very real interest in the case and was, by all criteria, at
the very least a quasi-party in the guise of an amicus curiae. As Justice Curtis
noted ixi a learned dissent,4 ' this presented a major constitutional problem with
regard to court jurisdiction. While suits between states fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Court, all jurisdictional grants involving the United States
mentioned in the Constitution are included within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court. By alloving the United States to participate as amicus curiae, the
Court was, in effect, evading the jurisdictional grants of article III which
literally applied would have prevented the federal government's participation
as an interested party in suits involving the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction.
37. See 35 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 193-98 (1915A); compare Green v. Biddle, .supra
note 36, with Campbell v. Swasey, 12 Ind. 70 (1859).
38. There were to be sure both prior and subsequent conventional uses of amicus curiae.
In Ex parte Randolph, 20 Fed. Cas. 242 (No. 11,558) (C.C. Va. 1833), a representative of
the United States appeared, stating specifically that "he appeared in the case at the request
of the court, as amicus curiae, and did not feel himself at liberty to make any admissions."
Id. at 244. He did, however, venture the opinion in passing that "it was the fashion of the
times, to raise constitutional questions, and nullify acts of congress." Id. at 250.
And in Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 250 (1850), the Taney Court allowed the
suggestion by amicus curiae, and agreed that the suit was collusive. See also, In re Ah Yup,
1 Fed. Cas. 223 (No. 104) (C.C. Cal. 1878), where the entire Bar was invited to make
"such suggestions as amicus curiae as occurred to them." Ibid.
39. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854).
40. Id. at 490.
4L Id. at 498.
19631
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In spite of Justice Curtis' high standing as a jurist and the skill and logic of
his position, the rest of the Court accepted the amicus curiae as an easy road
to solution of this thorny jurisdictional problem. This pattern became an ac-
cepted one, and it is today a commonplace for the 'United States to participate
as amicus curiae in cases arising under the original jurisdiction of the Court.42
In the decades that followed, the amicus curiae device continued to be used
to protect governmental interests, notably in connection with grants of land.43
The flow of litigation engendered by such programs saw the government ap-
pearing in third party guises to defend past allocations or claimed present hold-
ings. Then, in another far-reaching development, the Taney Court in the case
of The Gray Jacket 44 resolved another aspect of third party representation of
governmental interests caused by the appearance of more than one United
States agency. In this 1867 case, the Attorney General had already been heard
on behalf of the United States when the Treasury Department sought leave to
be heard" in opposition on behalf of any other departments of the government,
they nonetheless allowed the Treasury to be heard for two hours, since "the
Court is desirous of all the light that can be derived from the fullest discus-
sion." 45 This phenomenon of adverse representation by different departments
of the government taking opposite stands before the Court, rather than resolu-
tion within the executive branch, was then unusual, and remains "comparatively
infrequent." 46
Paralleling the courtesies extended to the United States, state interests also
came to require and receive accommodation. Some of these advantages accrued
to the state government through the familiar pattern of active participation of
state counsel as attorneys for private litigants or by admission of state attor-
neys into proceedings without formal categorization of the extent of participa-
tion. In 1864, for example, with the constitutionality of a state statute in issue,
the Attorney General of California filed a brief.47 During the 1880's the Court
began to grant leave directly to state counsel to vindicate state rights.48
Amicus Curiae and Third Party Representation of Private Interests
At the same time, and continuing until legislative clarification of the situa-
tion 4 9-most of which occurred in this century-the Court began to expand
42. See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
43. See, e.g., Dubuque & Pac. R.R. v. Litchfield, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 66, 68 (1859);
Platt v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 48 (1879); Mining Co. v. Consolidated
Mining Co., 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 167 (1880).
44. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 342 (1866).
45. Id. at 371.
46. Note, Judicial Resolution of Administrative Disputes Between Federal Agencies,
62 HARv. L. Rzv. 1050 (1949) ; Krislov, The Supreme Court Since 1937, Nine Judges in
Search of a Role 228-33 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University Library
1955). In United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949) the Solicitor General appeared for
both sides.
47. Steamship Co. v. Jolliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 450, 454 (1864).
48. See, e.g., Iowa v. McFarland, 110 U.S. 471 (1884); Mining Co. v. Consolidated
Mining Co., 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 167 (1880).
49. See Scott, Actions at Law in the Federal Courts, 38 HARv. L. IEv. 1 (1924) for
a good histor" 9f the transition from Court to legislative action, and the reciprocal in-
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the right of participation of private litigants.50 At times as intervenors, at times
as amicus curiae, depending on the situation and requests of the litigants or
agreements of the counsel, litigants of similar cases pending before the lower
courts and parties to lower court proceedings in a case before the Supreme Court
who had not joined in the appeal were allowed to state their views by brief or
oral presentation. Others claiming to be "real parties" in the case, or persons
who could be directly injured by a decision, were sometimes extended similar
privileges.
Such third party activity was not uniformly evident in all types of cases, and
certain types of litigation typically had a greater complexity as regards the
number of participants.51 Patent suits between the licensee and other parties
often involve the holders of the patent; land cases raised similar issues to those
raised in admiralty situations. Some types of cases were, strictly speaking, in
rem proceedings; others approached this category in consequences. Tax cases r2
and cases involving Indians and their rights 3 were preternaturally involuted,
presenting all types of problems in representation. In a somewhat tardy fash-
ion, the evolving use of the amicus brief as a form of third party representa-
tion came to be reflected in the nomenclature.
Formerly, the amicus curiae stood in an essentially professional relation to
the Court and organizations were not regarded as the amicus but rather the
lawyer himself. Throughout the last half of the nineteenth century the Court
and the briefs cling to this approach. As late as 1919 the attorneys in the Pro-
hibition Case rA styled themselves as "both of Washington, D.C., anic curiae,
and general counsel to the National Association of Distillers and Wholesale
Dealers." Apparently without self-consciousness, such identifications have been
totally forgotten. By the 1930's, the open identification of an arnicus brief with
an organizational sponsor was quite commonplace.55
The attribution of a brief to an organization belies the supposedly lawyer-
like role of the amicus, but realistically embraces and ratifies the transformation
of the actual pattern of behavior and its new function. The amicus is no longer
a neutral, amorphous embodiment of justice, but an active participant in the
interest group struggle.
Where the stakes are highest for the groups, and where the needs on the part
of the judges for information and for the sharing of responsibility through
fluence of the two processes; see also the leading articles by Moore & Levi, Federal Inter-
vention, 45 YALE L.J. 565 (1936), and 47 YALE L.J. 898 (1938), for legislation dealing with
private and public intervenors.
50. Ibid.
51. See, e.g., Bate Refrig. Co. v. Hammond, 129 U.S. 151 (1889); White-Smith Music
Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), and the discussion, in Northern Security Co. v. United
States, 191 U.S. 555 (1903).
52. See, e.g., Strattons Independence Ltd..v. Collector, 231 U.S. 399 (1913).
53. See, e.g., Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907).
54. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distil. Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919). This identifi-
cation is reprinted only in 40 Sup. Ct. 107 (1919) and not in the official Reports.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1935).
1963]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
consultation are at a peak, access has appropriately, and almost inevitably, been
at its greatest. Occasionally a lower court will refuse an amicus brief for being
"excessively partisan."5 6 Or, a state court will, like the Michigan court, strike
its permission to participate in view of the fact that a party "is acting (though
under disguise) not as a friend of the court but as a friend of one of the con-
testant litigants before said court."57
The Supreme Court of the United States makes no pretense of such disi-
terestedness on the part of "its friends."5 8 The amicus is treated as a potential
litigant in future cases, as an ally of one of the parties, or as the representative
of an interest not otherwise represented. At this level the transition is com-
plete; at the other court levels it is in process. Thus the institution of the
amicus curiae brief has moved from neutrality to partisanship, from friendship
to advocacy.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE SHIFr
However, the change from "impartial friend of the court" to acknowledged
adversary has implications which go far beyond a mere shift in the use of the
brief from a source of neutral information to a flexible tactical instrument
available to litigants and third parties. More significantly, the increased use of
the amicus brief mirrors the change in tactics and structure of interest articu-
lation in American politics as a whole that occurred during the latter quarter
of the nineteenth century. As Harold Lasswell has noted,59 that period saw a
transformation of dominant modes of interest activity. The emphasis shifted
from personal, face-to-face contacts (including corruption) to impersonal,
organized, and systematic, bureaucratically undertaken and oriented activity.
This transformation is. usually recognized only implicitly by commentators 60
when accounted for in terms of reaction, either to industrialization or bureau-
cratization-that is, as the product of either the industrial or the organizational
revolution.
The advantages that accrue to bureaucratically sophisticated groups in other
political arenas became evident in the judicial sphere as well. Involved are such
factors as: sensitivity to the possibility of raising new issues (whether for of-
fensive or defensive purposes) ; the ability to mobilize resources (including
56. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Saranac, 243 App. Div. 843, 278 N.Y.S. 203,
aff'd, 246 App. Div. 672, 283 N.Y.S. 498 (1935).
57. Brief for Respondent, p. 59, City of Grand Rapids v. Consumers Power Co., 216
Mich. 409, 185 N.W. 852 (1921). The court rejected the contention made by petitioner
that he was an intervenor on the basis of insufficient interest and rejected his offer to appear
as an amicus curiae presumably on grounds that his interest was too partisan for him to be
anything but an intervenor. Record, pp. 70-72.
58. See Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refrigerating Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946),
for a discussion of the outer limits which the Court may place on the efforts of an amicus
curiae to serve two masters, the court and the client. Implicit in such a limit is a recog-
nition of a norm of partnership for amici curiae.
59. Lasswell, Book Review, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 295 (1958).
60. See, e.g., BLAIsDEL., AMERICAN Dzmoc Acy UNDER PRESSURE (1957); Scinxrr-
GIESSER, THE LOBBYISTS (1951).
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human resources), and to bring to bear expertise, memory, or files; and the
organizational flexibility to respond quickly and sensitively before policy is set.
These are vital in all political matters, and in this the legislature, judiciary,
and administration remain similarly responsive. Perhaps the first consistent
utilization of the amicus brief's potential as a form of judicial lobbying can be
attributed to the Department of Justice.
The formation of the department in 1871 meant that broader vindication of
governmental rights was feasible. With the increase of staff came the develop-
ment of a broader "public interest" approach to government litigation, which
supplanted an attitude of emergency vindication only where absolutely neces-
sary.61
Charles J. Bonaparte's administration as Attorney General (1906-09) was
a particularly aggressive one with far-reaching developments in cases involving
Negro rights and vindication of federal legislation before the courts.02 He, if
anyone, seems to have been the innovator of a positive use of governmental
amicus briefs, not merely to vindicate specific statutes, but with a broader aim
of effectuating major social changes and implementing broad public policies.
Specifically, the United States as a third party actually was the principal liti-
gant in such cases as the Employer Liability Cases 63 and Bailey v. Alabama.04
And Bonaparte, after retirement from office, personally figured as an im-
portant ally in Buchanan v. Warley,65 which tested the constitutionality of at-
61. See EASLY-SMITH, THE DEPARTmENT OF JUSTICE (1904), and Klonoski, The In-
fluence of Government Counsel on Supreme Court Decisions Involving the Commerce
Power (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms 1958).
62. Moody, who was Bonaparte's predecessor, as attorney general had tended to con-
centrate on Supreme Court action. At the time of his elevation to the Supreme Court
Moody concluded that an even more intense focus would have been rewarding, and follow-
ing that advice, Bonaparte in twenty-seven months conducted fifty-six cases before the
highest tribunal, and personally argued forty-nine of them. Bonaparte, Experience of a
Cabinet Officer Under Roosevelt, 79 CENTURY MAGAZINE 752 (1910).
63. 207 U.S. 463 (1903). The conclusion that the United States was, in fact, the prin-
cipal litigator is derived from a number of factors. Bonaparte's 114-page brief amicus com-
pletely dwarfs the skimpy argument of the nominal litigants. Another indication of such
participation appears both here and in Johnson v. South Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904).
In both instances the printing order numbers indicate that the litigants' briefs and those
of the United States as amicus (in the latter case as a "suggestion") were printed together.
The numbers on the Employer Liability Cases were 22410-07 for plaintiffs, 22411-07 on the
government brief. The briefs in both instances were filed on the same day. No records are
available to show whether government briefs were continuously printed at the Government
Printing Office during the period involved. Letter from F_. E. Morsberger of the U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Jan. 7, 1960.
64. 211 U.S. 452 (1908) ; 219 U.S. 219 (1911). Wickersham for the Taft Adminis-
tration continued aggressively with the case, and the U.S. brief sustains the major part of
the legal argument.
65. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Charles Bonaparte wrote a series of articles in the Baltimore
Sun that was strongly relied on and quoted ex-tensively in the amicus brief of the Baltimore
NAACP. Brief of Baltimore NAACP as Amicus Curiae, pp. 24-30, Buchanan v. Warley,
supra. The case seems to have been a perfect forerunner of subsequent civil rights litiga-
tion, down to participation of various neighborhood "welfare associations," a group of legal
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tempts to establish Negro ghettos through local legislation. The practice of
governmental appearances in significant public causes, where very broad social
problems and a generalized public interest are involved, has become standard
procedure-as illustrated by such cases as the school segregation, racial conve-
nant, and redistricting litigation.
One major development which has contributed to the use of the amicus brief
has been the emergence of administrative agencies. The regulatory agencies
enforcing and establishing administrative policies have necessarily been involved
with a broad complex of interests. Their policies, in turn, affect a broader
skein of interests, both in direct and indirect fashion, than those of the older
executive agencies. In short, the activities of these agencies have involved
potential interests and actual participants beyond the normal course of individ-
ual social and political interaction with governmental agencies.G0 The fact that
this has been explicitly recognized has also reinforced the trend. Many ad-
ministrative agencies, acting by legislative provision or on their own initiative,
have broadened the base of official participation in hearings before them. They,
thus, have mobilized and alerted groups to issues and stakes involved at a stage
prior to judicial litigation. So alerted, groups and individuals have sought
means of strengthening favorable policies, both at the administrative level and
at the judicial level. 67
A transitional link between governmental agents acting as interest articu-
lators and private interest group activity in the judicial sphere was the partici-
pation of government officials in the guise of organized groups. So, in 1913 the
railroad commissions of eight states were conjoined in a single amicus curiae
brief.0 8 The 1916 term of the Court saw the National Association of Attorneys
General participate in cases, as well as groups of attorneys general. 0
scholars advocating Negro rights, and the accusation by the City of Baltimore as amicus
curiae that "outside agitation," notably by Senator Clapp of Minnesota, had really fostered
the litigation.
66. For some of the interest group complexities caused by administrative programs,
see, e.g., COMER, LEGISLATIvE FuNcTioNs OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIvE AUTHORITIES
198-270 (1927). Cf. Huntington, The Marasmnts of the ICC, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952).
The Huntington indictment and the notion of interest groups as capturing such agencies,
found throughout political science literature, has some connotations of an a priori analysis;
note that, as early as the tventies, progressives opposed creation of a Commerce Court
on the ground that it would be controlled by special interests. See FRANKFoRTER &
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 157 (1928).
67. In some instances governmental agencies may only participate as third parties, with
the U.S. Department of Justice entrusted with the real responsibility of litigation. See
Stem, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HARv. L. Rav. 758 (1954). The ICC
recognizes, for example, the right of complaint of any person, company, mercantile organi-
zation, manufacturing society, body politic, municipal organization, carrier, or state coin-
mission. See SHARFA N, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CoMMISSION 152 (1931). Even the
process of adjudication and the opinions of the commissioners encourage litigants. See
MASON, THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT 28 (1959).
68. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) ; Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474
(1913).
69. Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917) ; and Hall v. Geiger-
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917), where both the National Association of Attorneys General
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Among the private interest groups which were the first to utilize the oppor-
tunities of broader access were racial minority groups, securities and insurance
interests, railroad interests, and miscellaneous groups under severe attack, no-
tably the liquor interests in the first quarter of this century. Sheer familiarity
with the intricacies of the existing system, strong dissatisfaction with it, and
relative desperation seemingly can all function as sufficient motives for the
seeking out and the finding of new channels of influence for self-protection or
aggrandizement
The first example of minority group activity appears to have been the par-
ticipation of the Chinese Charitable and Benevolent Association of New York
in immigration cases. Beginning in the 1904 case of Ah How (alias Louis Ah
How) v. United States70 Mr. Max J. Kohler was to intervene in such cases,
explaining that:
The peculiar character of these Chinese Exclusion cases, involving arrests
or exclusions of Chinese persons, frequently indigent travellers far from
their home, and beyond the convenient reach of relatives and friends, as
well as of witnesses in their own behalf, has made it desirable for the
Chinese persons of the City of New York, and its immediate vicinity, by
concerted action and mutual aid, to assist each other ... and accordingly
at or about August 1, 1903, your petitioning corporation did retain Mr.
Max Kohler ... to defend Chinese persons arrested within or prevented
from entering the United States... il
Moreover, the identification of the NAACP with such briefs is not merely
a contemporary one, for that organization has, almost from its inception, par-
ticipated as amicus curiae in litigation. An early case in point is Guinn v.
United States,72 the famous Grandfather Clause case, where the NAACP justi-
fied its participation on the grounds that "the vital importance of these ques-
tions to every citizen of the United States, whether white or colored, seems
amply to warrant the submission of this brief."173
Highly regulated groups also were early participants. Since before the turn
of the century,74 litigation involving the ICC regulatory powers has involved
extensive non-party participation of interest groups (though not necessarily as
amicus curiae) .75 Following the principle enunciated by Merle Fainsod that
interest structure often arises in response to governmental patterns,.0 the trans-
portation industry has continued to be the most highly and intricately organized
and the Investment Bankers Association of America filed briefs; and Utah Power & Light
v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
70. 193 U.S. 65 (1904).
71. Brief for the Chinese Charitable and Benevolent Association of New York, as
Amicus Curiae, p. 2, Ah How v. United States, supra note 70.
72. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
73. Brief for NAACP as Amicus Curiae, p. 2, Guinn v. United States, stipra note 72.
74. See, e.g., ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. 167 U.S. 479 (1897).
75. See, e.g., ICC v. Chicago, RI. & Pac. Ry., 218 U.S. 88 (1910) (Seventeen organiza-
tions participated in a single amicus curiae brief).
76. Fainsod, Some Reflections on the Nature of the Regulatory Process, 1 Punuc
PoLIcy 296, 299 (1940).
1963]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
area of the interest group spectrum. Not only has there been continued repre-
sentation paralleling the political struggles of the railroad with the trucking
interests, of railroad management with laborers, or even individual members
with leaders; but also the report of Noble v. United States 77 records the appear-
ance on opposite sides of the fence of both the Regular Common Carriers Con-
ference of the American Trucking Association and the Contract Carriers Con-
ference of the ATA.
While stockholders, committees, and rival companies began to participate as
third parties in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, organized financial
groups and associations became active later, noticeably appearing in the Court
after about 1917.78 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distil. Co.,70 involving the consti-
tutionality of liquor prohibition, saw participation of interested organizations
in 1919, as did Pacific St. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon 80 in 1912, with public
service and ideologically oriented groups being the principal actors.
The transitional dates tend to cluster closely about the time of Brandeis'
effective use of a separate brief on behalf of the National Consumers' League
in Muller v. Oregon 81 in 1908. It is difficult to assess how strong a causal re-
lationship there was, for Brandeis insisted on appearing for the State of Ore-
gon, and as far as the Court was concerned, there were no indications of his
being in reality an amicus curiae. Such an arrangement was, for Brandeis, a
condition of his participation in that "the status of appearing as an official par-
ticipant on behalf of the state seemed to him an important element of strength
for the defense."8 2 However, as early as 1916, Frankfurter called attention to
the fact that Brandeis' role was essentially that of amicus curiae. 3
Yet another type of interest was to be heard from. In 1925 the Myers case,8 4
which tested the limits of legislative control over the power of executive ap-
pointment and removal, presented peculiar dilemmas of representation. Legis-
lative interests were presumably to be defended by the plaintiff, and the execu-
tive position directly by the Department of Justice. Quite naturally Congress
was restive under the arrangement, and the President Pro Tem of the Senate
and the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee were conferring with
regard to possible action, when the Court, apparently on its own initiative, ap-
pointed George Wharton Pepper as amicus curiae to present the congressional
77. 319 U.S. 88, 89 (1943).
78. See note 69 supra. At least so far as I have been able to determine, these cases
mark the first instances of such appearances.
79. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distil., 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
80. 223 U.S. 118 (1912). Among others, briefs were filed for The American, Bureau
of Political Research and the People's Rule League of America.
81. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
82. MASON, THME LANGUAGE OF DISSENT 248 (1959); Vose, The National Consumers
League and the Brandeis Brief, 1 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 267 (1957) ; GOLDMARX, IM'ATIMN
CRUSADER 163 (1953).
83. Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Rcalism in Constitutional Law, 29 -1Av, L.
Rzv. 353, 372 n.63 (1916).
84. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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point of view.8 5 Such legislative representation has been employed periodically
since that time, including an extended oral presentation on one occasion by
the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.80
Thus, by the mid-nineteen-twenties, these major types of political interests
had all witnessed at least one major instance of representation before the United
States Supreme Court. Throughout the subsequent years the number of cases
in which such briefs were filed grew in number, as did the number of such briefs
filed in cases.8 7 By the nineteen-thirties, such briefs were commonplace, and by
the late nineteen-forties they were beginning to be regarded by the Court as
potential sources of irritation. At the same time they were increasingly of
significance to the outcome and were even cited on occasion as justification for
the granting of certiorari.88
While a series of "discrete and insular minorities" of a fiscal and commercial
nature early found the amicus curiae brief a useful and potent instrument, it
was the use of the device by civil rights organizations which drew widespread
public attention. The American Civil Liberties Union was most active in this,
as in other aspects of fostering minority group activity. In accordance with its
standard policy of developing groups so as to encourage self-defense, the ACLU
has characteristically contracted its activities as each minority group has be-
come capable of handling its own litigation, participating only by invitation.89
85. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1925, p. 2, coL 2, and FwNrAuzrm & LA.,mxs, THE
Busnmss oF TuE SuPREm COURT 311-12, for accounts of the Myers case. Further polit-
ical interest representation was secured in Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refin-
ing Co., 338 U.S. 604 (1950). Puerto Rico was here allowed to intervene formally to pro-
tect its interests after an effective plea that pointed out that: "Puerto Rico has no access to
the political process .... In the Congress the territory has only a Resident Commissioner,
who by courtesy of that body-there is no law on the subject-is indulged in a seat in the
House of Representatives but has no vote. As a 'discrete and insular minority' ... the people
of Puerto Rico must depend upon the courts." Memorandum for the Government of Puerto
Rico, p. 21.
86. See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 128 (1935), for presentation by Repre-
sentative Hatton W. Sumners. In Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Vll.) 590
(1875), Mr. Philip Phillips orally, and Mr. B. R. Curtis through a brief written before his
death, participated as friends of the court. Wiener's statement that Pepper's appearance
was the only instance of oral presentation by an amicus curiae other than the Attorney
General is in error. Wiener, The Suprense Court's New Rules, 68 HAIv. L. Rsv. 20, 81
n.303 (1954). See also RoBarsoN, APPEmATE PRACriCE AM PRocEnuD En THE SUPRE.
COURT OF THE UNr STATES 201-02 (1929).
87. Harper & Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1172
(1953).
88. See Harper & Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1172
(1953) ; Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 HARv. L. REv. 20 (1954) ; Sonnen-
feld, Participation of Amici Curiae . .. 1949-1957, WoRKn PAPERS U; RESEARCH METH-
ODOLOGY No. 3 (mimeo. Michigan State University) (1958), for instances of abuse by amici
curiae. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), and Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S.
159 (1942), for instances where amici curiae were cited as evidence in justification for
granting review.
89. See Private Attorneys-General: Group Action i; the Fight for Ciit Liberties, 58
YALE L.J. 574, 579 (1949).
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Thus, numerous organizations which developed under ACLU tutelage are
now largely independent in orientation and activities. Despite sharp differentia-
tion in attitudes toward, and methods of, litigation, some lessons of legal strategy
have remained a common legacy of the various civil rights groups. They also
have retained some minimal cohesion in many of the efforts to affect court rul-
ings, as well as in their political activities, although hardly to the extent some-
times portrayed by opponents.90
Vose has shown that by informal and nonsystematic cooperation civil rights
groups did tend to coordinate their activities in the conduct of litigation, al-
though the vagaries of chance and the actions of legal participants often
thwarted any of the vague efforts at coordination."' An increased reliance on
litigation as a means of vindicating minority rights otherwise difficult to obtain
through the political process, however, resulted in civil rights organizations
such as the ACLU, and the American Jewish Congress, being among the most
active filers of amicus curiae briefs over the past few years.92 In addition, labor
organizations have been active, and not only in labor cases. 3 Important civil
rights cases such as the desegregation decision or the restrictive covenant cases
saw a turnout of large numbers of amicus curiae briefs from varying minority
group organizations. All of this focused attention and provoked criticism of the
amicus curiae brief.94
Such briefs reached an apex of notoriety and criticism during the last half of
the forties and the early fifties. A previous rise in the number of filings was
a major factor in this criticism. In a classic instance, Lawson v. United States,03
the problem of the Hollywood "unfriendly ten" evoked attention through amicus
curiae briefs from forty organizations. Left-wing groups were both aggressive
and open in their efforts to exploit the increased significance of this avenue to in-
terest participation. The National Lawyers Guild, for example, both was and is a
major filer of amicus curiae briefs. The relation of the amicus brief to standard
pressure group tactics has been made even more overt. Thus, the Communist
Daily Worker has called upon individuals to file "personal" amicus curiae briefs
by writing letters directly to the Justices. 0 Clearly, amicus briefs are merely the
most formal of a number of lobbying tactics which include other devices such as
the picketing utilized during the trial of Communist Party leaders tinder the
Smith Act in New York City. Similarly in 1953, petitions were circulated by the
National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case. A campaign of
telegrams was part of the effort to save the life of Willie McGee, who had been
90. See Krislov, Book Review, The New Leader, April 11, 1960, p. 25.
91. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY ch. 4-8 (1959).
92. Sonnenfeld, Participation of Amici Curiae by Filing Briefs and Presenting Oral
Argument in Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1949-1957 11, 16 (Michigan. State Univer-
sity Governmental Research Bureau, 1958).
93. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
94. See Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 HARV. L. Rzv. 20 (1954).
95. 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950).
96. Harper . Etheringtoni Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. Rav. 1172-73
(19$4),
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sentenced to death in Mississippi. Mr. Justice Black, who had been generally
sympathetic to interest group expression, found this a repugnant development
and condemned the "growing practice of sending telegrams to judges in order to
have cases decided by pressure." He refused to read them and noted that "counsel
in this case has assured me they were not responsible for these telegrams." '
The lack of discreetness here-the ignoring of the traditions and practices
of the judicial process-has even been demonstrated by attorneys. Wiener
characterizes a brief in Girouard v. United States as purposely ignoring in its
preoccupation with propaganda the decisive issue on which the case turned. 3
Similarly, the American Newspaper Publishers brief in Craig v. Harney 0
evoked from Mr. Justice Jackson a strong response indicating that he thought its
emphasis on the size and power of the constituent newspapers was neither of
legal significance nor an accident but simply intimidation. (In fairness, it should
be noted that size and distribution of membership is relevant to any showing
of interest in an instant case and even amicus curiae briefs are expected to
represent a specific rather than a diffuse interest.)
The question of the proper relationship of an amicus to the principal party
and the principal argument is a complex one. In the modem context of
partisan "neutrality" the amicus' orientation is a peculiar one and it has been
a tenet of proponents of the need for restrictions that the modem amicus briefs
have lacked a well defined rule. A simple endorsement of a basic brief adds
nothing to the cause except the prestige of the group making the endorsement.
This is to invite the charge of political pressure. On the other hand concentrat-
ing on purely legal argument has its problems as well. Some amicus curiae
briefs have, of course, been of great legal guidance to the Court-Mr. Justice
Frankfurter relied greatly upon the Synagogue Council of America brief in the
McCollum case, for example.100 This, however, occurs generally when there is
evidence of some weakness in the legal talent arrayed by the principal party,
or when the interest of the amicus curiae is, in fact, very sharply differentiated
from that of the litigant. These cases are not the run-of-the-miU ones. In most
instances the situation is less stark and the considerations more complex.10 '
Where there is relatively adequate representation of the basic points of view,
the amicus curiae, however, may perform a valuable subsidiary role by intro-
ducing subtle variations of the basic argument, or emotive and even question-
able arguments that might result in a successful verdict, but are too risky to
be embraced by the principal litigant. The strategy here is the reverse of that
utilized by Brandeis-instead of identifying new techniques with a litigant's
official position, it may very well be advantageous to label the new as unofficial
so that, if it should be rejected, a minimum of disapprobation attaches to the
97. Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 Annals 29 (Sept.
1958) ; N.Y. Times, March 16, 1951, p. 23, col. 4.
98. Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 HaRv. L. Rnv. 20, 80 n.296 (1954).
99. 331 U.S. 367, 397 (1947).
100. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 229 .19 (1948).
101. See generally Harper & Etherington, supra note 96.
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official cause. Arguments that might anger the Justices, doctrines that have not
yet been found legally acceptable, and emotive presentations that have little
legal standing can best be utilized in most instances by the amicus rather than
by the principals. The NAACP, for example, suggested the overruling of Plcssy
v. Ferguson as an amicus curiae in Henderson v. United States.10 2 And some-
times such suggestions bear fruit. For example, the ACLU amicus curiae brief
was apparently influential in the overturning of Wolf v. Colorado.103
The considerations involved in such supplementary usages of the amicus
curiae brief are admirably portrayed in the discussion between Charles Abrams
and Newman Levy of the American Jewish Committee in connection with the
restrictive covenant cases. When asked his views of a prospective brief to be
filed by the American Jewish Committee, Abrams wrote:
It is an excellent "main brief" written with your fine straight style. But
I question the adequacy of its emphasis as a brief amici.
I have always viewed the function of the amid to take up and emphasize
those points which are novel or which if stressed in the main brief, might
dilute or weaken the main forceful arguments.
I never thought there was much cumulative force in the repetition of
logic by eighteen briefs. Unlike good poetry, repeated it has a tendency
to bore. But a weak legal argument, with a moral quality, forcefully pre-
sented by an "outsider" will not detract from the force of the main argu-
ment....
The amici should be providing the arguments that will salvage the
judges' consciences or square with their prepossessions should they lean
toward holding for us....
Play up what entailment of all land would mean socially. Use the rele-
vant references by Gunnar Myrdal; give the British background for exclu-
sion of non-conformists and their migration to America where the freehold
and the fee simple became one of our earliest and greatest traditions. Show
how Jefferson and the states immediately after Independence adopted laws
excluding primogeniture and entail.... May people band together to bar
a race from food and clothing? These are a few of the important irrelevan-
cies that occur to me.
Why desert all these rich and adventurous passages to jam the safe
waters that should be reserved for the main advocates ?104
But the strategies for the amici may be different from the strategies of those
interested merely in winning the case. This is suggested by Newman Levy's
reply:
I thoroughly agree with everything you say about the function of an
amicus brief. So far as the court is concerned I am inclined to think that
it is pretty much like an endorsement on a note. Its purpose is to tell the
court that we agree with the appellant and we hope it will decide in his
favor....
When this brief was first contemplated I discussed it with my legal com-
mittee, and they agreed that I should confine myself exclusively to this
102. Brief for NAACP as Amicus Curiae, Henderson v. United States, 314 U.S. 625
(1941).
103. For the role of the amicug curiae and of the principal litigant see the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlar, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 675 n.S (1961).
104. Vosa, CAUcAsLws ONLY 166-67 (1959).
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constitutional question. That was why I omitted the sociological stuff, the
United Nations Charter and the rest of it. You see, if the Supreme Court
should happen to mention in its decision that restrictive covenants are
illegal upon the authority of Buchanan v. Warley, we will be able to say
to our members, "Isn't that exactly what we told the court?"'' 5
Thus the function of the amicus can be viewed as simply one of endorsement,
or it can be seen also as part of the supplementary strategies available to the
principal litigants.
Whether or not the tactical potential of the amicus brief is realized in any
given suit will ultimately depend on the rules of the Court governing the filing
of amicus petitions and the willingness of the Court to permit the filing of any
given brief. Prior to 1937, there appears to have been no written rule on the
subject of the filing of an amicus curiae brief, and leave of the Court was
necessary for filing.1°6 The specification in that year that litigating parties must
give consent to nongovernmental amicus briefs made no real difference in prac-
tice. Prior to the adoption of the rule, it had been standard procedure to re-
quest permission from the parties. In the absence of such consent, leave to file
was easily obtained from the Court in almost every instance both before and
after promulgation of the rule.
The change of 1949, on its face, seemed to liberalize the rules. It recognized
the existence of briefs filed by order of the Court without consent of the parties
-a procedure which had not been formalized in previous rules. Since such fil-
ings had, as we have seen, been standard, the more significant indicator for
future practice was the intimation that amicus briefs and motions to file would
have to be submitted within "a reasonable time" prior to decision, indicating
some dissatisfaction with dilatory filing of such briefs in the past. Further, the
brief for motion to file was to be a separate document from the brief on the
merits, permitting the Justices to avoid wading through the entire argument
before deciding whether such a brief was to be permitted their attention. Even
more direct and succinct was the Court's reaction to applications to file with-
out consent of the parties: "Such motions are not favored."107 Although a tech-
nical reading of the rules (now Rules 42(1) and 42(2)) indicates disfavor
only for motions to file on the jurisdictional question or for petitions for a writ
of certiorari without party consent and do not extend this disfavor to amicus
curiae briefs on the merits, in practice it has appeared that the disfavor obtains
equally in both instances' 08
The result was quite marked. In the 1948 term prior to the new rule, four-
teen briefs were filed without party consent, while the Court denied permission
to file only three such briefs. With the new attitude of the Court, the five terms
following promulgation of the rule saw denial of leave to file without party con-
105. Id. at 167.
106. RoBERTsoN, PRACTICE AND PRoCEDURE IN THE SUPREME CouRT oF THE UNrrr
STATES 200 (rev. ed. 1929).
107. Sup. Ct. Rules 27:9(b), 338 U.S. 959 (1949).
108. Comment, The Ainicus Curiae, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 469, 475 (1960).
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sent in thirty-nine instances, while in only twelve instances was permission
granted.'0 9
Equally significant was the interpretation of the new mood of the Court by
the Solicitor General. Since approximately fifty per cent of the cases before the
Court involved the United States as a party, his agreement to the filing of
briefs was a vital determinant of the extent of amicus participation if the Court
was to continue to deny the bulk of requests for filing without permission of
parties. Prior to 1949, his consent was, like that of the Court, almost automatic,
but after the new rule -his refusal became completely automatic. 110 The Court's
attitude and the Solicitor General's interpretation drastically reduced partici-
pation of amicus curiae. In 1949, 118 briefs were filed in fifty-three cases, and
on eleven occasions oral argument by amicus curiae was permitted. In 1950,
thirty-six cases only saw 70 briefs, and in 1951, there were only thirty cases
with such briefs, with only forty-four amicus curiae allowed to participate.111
However, in 1952, the Solicitor General's attitude was subjected to sharp
criticism emanating from different conceptions of the proper role of the amicus
curiae held by Justices Black and Frankfurter. On the one hand, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter expressed dissatisfaction with the Solicitor General's actions for
the somewhat paradoxical reason that under the rules denial of permission of
leave to file became the responsibility of the parties to the litigation.112 It would
not do, Frankfurter argued, for the Solicitor General to refuse permission
automatically in response to what he saw as an attitude of the Court, since
the effect of such denial was to continue to put the burden on the Court to
distinguish between proper and improper briefs. 113 Thus Mr. Justice Frank-
furter further emphasized the sharp departure from notions of the neutrality of
the amicus curiae that the rule entailed by making clear the primary responsi-
bility of the parties for inclusion or exclusion of briefs before the Court.
While Mr. Justice Black concurred in Lee v. United States with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissatisfaction with the policies of the Department of Justice, his
agreement was only superficial. Mr. Justice Black agreed that the Solicitor
General ought not to withhold consent automatically, but essentially he regarded
the Court rule as needlessly restrictive. Thus, his criticism of the Solicitor
General was that he had further restricted a restrictive rule and his primary
complaint was against the Court itself. This position is further spelled out in
his dissent to the reformulation of the Court's 1949 rule in 1954. In an objec-
tion to an order adopting generalized rules for the Court which substantially
recodified the 1949 changes, Mr. Justice Black declared:
109. See table at note 119 infra.
110. See Lee v. United States, 344 U.S. 924 (1952) ; United States v. Lance, Inc.,
342 U.S. 915 (1952). See also SCHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL PoLrncs 77 (1960).
111. Sonnenfeld, Participation, of Amii Curiae by Filing Briefs and Presenting Oral
Argument in Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1949-1957 (Michigan, State University
Governmental Research Bureau) 4, Table 1 (1958); SCHUBERT, QUANTrATIVE ASPEC'rs
OF JUDIcIAL BEHAVIOR 74-75 (1959).
112. See Lee v. United States, 344 U.S. 924 (1952) ; United States v. Lance, Inc., 342
U.S. 915 (1952).
113. United States v. Lance, Inc., 342 U.S. 915 (1952).
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I have never favored the almost insuperable obstacle of rules put in the
way of briefs sought to be filed by persons other than the actual litigants.
Most of the cases before this Court involve matters that affect far more
than the immediate record parties. I think the public interest and judicial
administration would be better served by relaxing rather than tightening
the rule against amicus curiae briefs.114
The Solicitor General in response to criticism modified his policies in 1952,
and in 1957 his office issued a statement of policy defining the standard gov-
erning grant or denial of consent. The Department of Justice frowns upon the
filing by amici with merely an academic 4nterest at one extreme, or those who
merely wish to engage in propaganda on the other. Consent is given "where
the applicant has a concrete, substantial interest in the decision of the case, and
the proposed brief would assist the Court by presenting relevant arguments or
materials which would not otherwise be submitted." This change in position
does not, of course, restore pre-1949 ease of filing and for several years, no
great change in rate of filing of briefs resulted from this relaxation of policy."0
The 1954 rule changes essentially reorder the 1949 provisions with minor
exceptions. The separate printed motion for leave to file is explicitly limited to
five pages as opposed to the 1949 rules provision that it "concisely state" mat-
ters. In addition, a new rule-rule 44-provides that the time for oral amicus
curiae presentations made with consent of a party will be taken out of the allot-
ment for the consenting party. Both changes are essentially, though not signifi-
cantly, restrictive, but together with the re-enactment of the rest of the 1949
rules, they provide strong evidence that Mr. Justice Black's position with re-
gard to filing was then repudiated and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's point of view
upheld."' 6
The reasons are not hard to understand. Mr. Justice Black to the contrary
notwithstanding, the present rules do, in fact, allow broad representation of in-
terests, while at the same time providing for a minimum of Court responsi-
bility. The delegation of scrutiny of the briefs not only saves time, but also
transfers the "friendship" of the participating interests to the litigating parties.
One effect of the Court rule is to transfer some of the responsibility over
amicus curiae briefs to the litigant and therefore to aid the principal litigant
in the formulation of his strategies-provided he can convince the amicus to
cooperate. The Court attitude also permeates outward to the amici who, like
the American Jewish Congress, adopt the view that they will examine their
participation closely and "have been deterred from taking any action by the
unlikelihood of either obtaining consent or getting permission from the court."117
The rules and their enforcement are, then, only part of the picture. The Court
114. Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme Court, 346 U.S. 947 (1954).
115. Sonnenfeld, supra note 111, Appendix C (contains the text of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's statement of May, 1957). Discussed in ScnuEmT, op. cit. supra note 111, at 72-73
and Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 Annals 29 (Sept 1958).
See also Weiner, supra note 94, at 80-81.
116. See note 114 supra.
117. Harper & Etherington, supra note 96, at 1175.
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can in many cases effect its policy without having to deny permission to file
briefs. With its clearly stated residual powers to grant or deny permission, and
its unformalized power to invite amicus curiae to file briefs, the Court is funda-
mentally in control of the filing under the new rules, while nonetheless pleasing
those of the bar who had called for restriction. In addition, the knowledge of
deadlines and the likelihood of scrutiny by professionals prior to filing may
improve the quality of such amicus curiae briefs. However, briefs containing
divergent points of view and new issues are not likely to obtain approval of the
parties. 18 All of this, of course, continues and accentuates the trend toward
delegation by the Court of the problem of control to litigants.
However, if the small number of refusal of permissions to file by the Court and
its recent generosity in granting leave to file provide any basis for judg-
ment, a new equilibrium has apparently been reached. The trend is difficult to
document because it is virtually impossible to obtain data on refusal by private
parties of permission to file except in the case of so prominent and regular a
participant as the Solicitor General. One cannot even take the record of ap-
plications to the court for permission to file in the absence of approval by the
parties, since application to file is a function of preception of Court attitude
toward the filing of such briefs as well as the refusal of the parties in the first
instance.
On the other hand, the post-1949 record of denial of permission by the Court
has never been excessive. At its maximum it was seventeen; it has, on the whole,
been declining steadily since 1955. During the 1961 term it reached a level that
has not been seen since prior to the 1949 rules-permission to file was denied
only twice. At the same time the number of briefs filed has also risen steadily
to pre-1949 heights."19 Seemingly the newest figures portend a new attitude.
118. See Comment, The Ainicu.s Curiae, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 469, 476 (1960). However,
the proposition that in practice permission by the Court is "rarely granted," id. at 475 is
belied by the actualities. See table at note 119 infra.
119. TRwDS IN FILING, GRANTING AND DENIAL OF
BRIEFS AmcuS AND ORAL PARTICIPATION,
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1949-1961 TEMS*
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Cases 53 36 30 39 20 47 41 39 43 63 43 57 54
Briefs 118 70 44 64 34 57 74 69 64 85 64 97 107
Oral Argument 11 3 3 3 7 20 3 1 2 3 5 4 7
Motions Granted 1 3 2 3 3 0 5 18 10 12 19 27 2V
(briefs)
Motions Granted 11 3 3 3 3 7 3 0 2 0 1 0 4
(oral)
Motions Denied 0 1 16 16 6 11 17 8 6 13 10 0 2
(briefs)
Motions Denied 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 6 1 1 0 0 0
(oral)
*Sources of this table include U.S. Reports; Sonnenfeld, mpra note 111, Table 1; and
ScHUBERT, op. cit. supra note 111, at 74-75.
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One insight to be drawn from a study of the amicus brief-and more par-
ticularly, the dispute between Justices Black and Frankfurter-is the extent
to which the brief's use may mirror the controversy over the Court's law-
making function-a controversy presented in oversimplified terms by the phrases
judicial "activism" and "passivism." To the extent that Mr. Justice Frank-
furter favors returning control over amicus briefs to the litigating parties, he
reflects a belief that the amicus device should serve its function solely within
the framework of the adversary model. Similarly, to the extent that Air. Justice
Black resists such restraints, he is supporting a broadening of the interests likely
to come before the Court and the issues presented to it for resolution. Under
such a modified adversary system, the brief as a form of information gathering
may provide the judicial counterpart of lobbying and congressional hearings in
the legislative process. And the Court's attitude, practices, and rules regarding
the granting of premission to file amicus briefs may indicate the extent to which
it desires to engage in quasi-legislative activities and to depart from a role of
narrowly resolving adversary disputes.
This function of the amicus brief as an aid to judicial law making finds a
logical counterpart in the utilization by the Court of its power to request the
submission of amicus briefs. This power has been lately used, most dramatically,
in the realm of desegregation where the courts have openly assumed the task of
formulating and implementing constitutional mandates. While the power, as
we shall see, has long been used in a variety of situations, its recent use once
again belies any static conception of the amicus curiae.
The participation of the amici need not be at their own initiative. A court
may request participation on its own. The Solicitor General of the United
States and representatives of other governmental units are regularly invited to
participate and file a brief. From time to time individuals with specialized
knowledge have been called upon to offer their expertise in service to the United
States Supreme Court. Lower courts have utilized the amicus for various spe-
cial formal assignments, similar to those of a Master or Referee. Such func-
tions include the handling of special problems dealing with juvenile delinquents
-and the individuals are sometimes designated by the anglicized title, Friends
of the Court, to distinguish this investiture from the less formalized amicus
function.
Again, a court may call upon members of the bar (or more usually appro-
priate law officers) to act directly on behalf of the court itself. Here, in a sense,
the old private relationship of the lawyer to the court is recreated; the friend-
ship of the officer is most emphatically for the court. Thus in Universal
Oil Products Co. v. Root Refrigerating Co.,12- the amid had been designated
to participate in an inquiry with regard to the possibility of fraud and bribery
in the original court order. When dishonesty on the part of a judge was shown,
the amid who had also been attorneys for affected parties, though not principal
litigants, sought to obtain compensation which in effect would have been re-
120. 328 U.S. 575, 581 (1946).
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imbursement for their employers. The Court rejected such a claim. The role
precluded their basically participating in a dual capacity:
No doubt, a court that undertakes an investigation of fraud upon it may
avail itself, as did the court below, of amici to represent the public interest
in the administration of justice. But compensation is not the normal re-
ward of those who offer such services.... Here the amici also represented
substantial private interests. Their clients were interested in vacating the
Root Judgment though they would not subject themselves to the court'sjurisdiction and the hazards of an adverse determination. While the amici
formally served the court, they were in fact in the pay of private clients.
Amici selected by the court to vindicate its honor ordinarily ought not to
be in the service of those having private interests in the outcome. Certainly
it is not consonant with that regard for fastidiousness which should govern
a court of equity, to award fees and costs of amici curiae who have already
been compensated by private clients so that these be reimbursed for what
they voluntarily paid.121
Thus while vindicating the right to appoint such amici, the Supreme Court
asserted a special relationship between such amici and the court who designates
them.
Indeed "friendship" at this point becomes a peculiar sort of advocacy. The
amicus becomes the spokesman for court interests in a vital and active sense.
This is well borne out in the recent cases involving desegregation. The Su-
preme Court's device of delegating to the district courts the implementation of
its desegregation decision has thrust upon the district courts an unusual burden
of decision and activity.122 Where defiance has occurred, the courts have been
particularly dependent upon the activities of the executive and have acknowl-
edged this dependency.
So in both the Little Rock, Arkansas, and the University of Mississippi in-
tegration crises the federal district court, on its own initiative, designated the
United States Attorney General and the United States Attorney as amici and
specifically instructed its designated amici to carry out activities on behalf of
the court. On September 9, 1957, in order to enforce its prior determinations 123
the district court in Arkansas invited the Attorney General of the United States
and the United States Attorney to
come into the case as [amici] curiae and to commence injunction proceed-
ings against the Governor and his subordinates "to prevent the existing
interferences with and obstructions to the carrying out of the orders here-
tofore entered by this Court in this case.'- 24
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the case was styled
Fau bus v. United States (amicus curiae). 125 Among other claims, the attor-
neys for Governor Faubus argued that the United States had no standing to
file such a petition for injunctive relief and that the court had erred in giving
121. Id. at 580-81.
122. See PELTASoN, FiFTY-EIGHT LoNELY MEN (1961).
123. Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957).
124. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 16 (E.D. Ark. 1958).
125. 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958).
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the United States such powers. The court of appeals, however, found that
this was in accordance with past procedure and that it was "proper for the court
to do all that reasonably and lawfully could be done to protect and effectuate
its orders and judgments." The district court had acted properly in asking the
law officers of the United States to act on its behalf for it "could not with pro-
priety employ private counsel to do the necessary investigative and legal work.
It has, we think, always in the past been customary for a federal district court
to call upon the law officers of the United States for aid and advice in com-
parable situations.' ' 2 6
There was no need to go into the legal theory too thoroughly, the court of
appeals pointed out, inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the Aaron case were still real
parties in interest and had joined the government in requesting this injunction.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals emphatically upheld the authority both of
the court and its amici:
In our opinion the status of the attorney general and the United States
attorney was something more than that of mere amici curiae in private
litigation. They were acting under the authority and direction of the court
to take such action as was necessary to prevent its orders and judgments
from being frustrated and to represent the public interest in the due ad-
ministration of justice.' 27
Similarly, when it became obvious that the State of Mississippi was engaged
on a course of defiance of the court orders in Mcredith v. Fair,'s the United
States was designated as amicus curiae on September 18, 1962, by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It was authorized to appear before the court
of appeals and the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
with the right to submit pleadings, evidence, arguments and briefs and to
initiate such further proceedings, including proceedings, for injunctive re-
lief and proceedings for contempt of court, as may be appropriate in order
to maintain and preserve the due administration of justice and the integrity
of the judicial processes of the United States.12
Two days later the amicus curiae asked for an injunction to prevent enforce-
ment of a bill signed that very day by the governor which would have prevented
Meredith from enrolling; the sheriff was also enjoined from proceeding on a
rather weak perjury charge in connection with a previous voting enrollment
by Meredith. 30 On federal initiative a temporary restraining order vas also
issued by the court of appeals on September 25 enjoining the State of Missis-
sippi, the governor, and numerous officials from interfering with Meredith's
enrollment, as well as enjoining numerous legal steps leading toward this end,
including the filing of actions in the state courts.13' With the governor's refusal,
126. Id. at 805.
127. Ibid. Also joined as appellants but filing no briefs were Cooper, e! al. of the Little
Rock School Board.
128. 7 RAcE R .L. REP. 748 (1962). For background of the case, see Meredith v.
Fair, 199 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Miss. 1961).
129. 7 RAcE Ru_ L. REP. 749 (1962).
130. Id. at 752-53 (issuance of injunction).
131. Id. at 75657.
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a show cause order went out to the governor and lieutenant governor and the
contempt citation of September 28 was issued. The governor was convicted of
civil contempt after evidence "on behalf of the United States and of the appel-
lant, 13 2 while the lieutenant governor, on the 29th, was found guilty upon
presentation only of "evidence on behalf of the United States."183 In both in-
stances the civil contempt was of the September 25 order which had been issued
upon the application of the amicus curiae.
The partial compliance of the governor with the orders of the court subse-
quently eliminated the need for civil contempt. However, in December, acting
under orders from the court, the amicus curiae moved to have the governor
found in criminal contempt because of his continuous criticism of the processes
of integration and his consequent failure to purge himself of contempt. Not the
least paradoxical aspect of the affair is the hiring of private counsel to represent
the United States and the Attorney General.13 4 The judgment of the Department
of Justice was that its staff had been too involved in the proceedings in their
executive capacities to be the best possible vindicators of the court's honor.
Thus, even the closest possible relationship of friendship to the court-acting
directly for it-has evolved into an active advocacy of the most demanding
and consuming nature. This most fervent friendship for the court involves the
taking on of the court as a special sort of client, one whose claims are of an
even higher and purer partisanship.
CONCLUSIONS
The amicus curiae brief represents a prime example of a legal institution
evolving and developing while maintaining superficial identity with the past.
It has been a catch-all device for dealing with some of the difficulties presented
by the common law system of adversary proceeding. In the United States, in
particular, it has allowed representation of governmental and other complex
interests generated by the legal involutions of federalism. In addition, the
United States Supreme Court has helped foster its development as a vehicle
for broad representation of interests, particularly in disputes where political
ramifications are wider than a narrow view of common law litigation might
indicate. Groups inherently weak in the political arenas or unequally endowed
with resources of wealth or skills have quite naturally been the leaders in the use
of the brief. The growth of the regulatory process and the welfare state have
played a significant role in fostering group organization and an awareness of
policy determination by the judiciary.
On occasion, the amicus curiae has been an agent of the court acting as
champion of the court's point of view, vigorously pursuing and defending
a legal position at the request of the bench itself. In the main, however,
132. Id. at 761 (civil contempt conviction of Governor Barnett).
133. Id. at 762 (civil contempt conviction of Lieutenant Governor Paul B. Johnson,
Jr.).
134. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 24, 1962, p. 5, cols. 2-3. Mr. Leon Jaworskl of the
Texas Bar was hired to represent the United States.
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the amicus curiae has been a means of fostering partisan third party involve-
ment through the encouragement of group representation by a self-conscious
bench. The judges have sought to gain information from political groups as
well as to give them a feeling of participation in the process of decision. Access
to the legal process on the part of such organizations is a logical extension of
realistic awareness of law as a process of social choice and policy making. Even
criticism of the amicus curiae brief as "political propaganda," court embarrass-
ment at such criticism, and changes in the rules which have hampered such
briefs in the short run have not seriously stemmed the growing reliance upon
it.
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